Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: The Resurrection of Bell v. Wolfish and the Questions to Follow by Ellis, Julian
Denver Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 2 Article 8 
December 2020 
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: The Resurrection of Bell 
v. Wolfish and the Questions to Follow 
Julian Ellis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Julian Ellis, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: The Resurrection of Bell v. Wolfish and the 
Questions to Follow, 90 Denv. U. L. Rev. 559 (2012). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS:
THE RESURRECTION OF BELL V. WOLFISH
AND THE QUESTIONS TO FOLLOW
ABSTRACT
The balance between Fourth Amendment rights and strip search po-
lices in a correctional setting has garnered limited attention from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Moreover, the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent
by circuit courts has been inconsistent, and at times irreconcilable, with
the governing standards. In upholding the strip search policies at issue in
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Court sought to add clarity
to the existing law and reign in circuits that had expanded the Court's
precedent beyond established measures. The Florence Court premised its
decision primarily on the need for deference to correctional expertise and
the security concerns that invasive strip search policies seek to preclude.
Furthermore, in the face of a highly critical dissent, the Court declined to
adopt the majority of circuits' view that a heighted standard of suspicion
is required to justify a strip search.
Although the Florence majority's holding may seem harsh on its
face because of the degrading nature of invasive strip searches, the
Court's decision is consistent with the standards promulgated in Bell v.
Wolfish and ensures the protection of many over the rights of a single
individual. This Comment concludes that the Court's holding promotes
adaptive, rather than reactive, policies in the hands of those with the
greatest expertise. Moreover, blanket strip search policies protect those
incarcerated by both subjecting arrestees to the same, consistent policy
and by eliminating forms of dangerous contraband.
Finally, although the strip search policies were upheld in Florence,
there are potential mitigating factors that will have to be addressed in the
coming years. This Comment opines that both the presence of alternative
holding facilities and the emergence of new technologies represent the
most viable mechanisms for dampening the perceived harshness of the
Court's holding. However, the Court's refusal to define such factors in
Florence provides little guidance to circuit courts and encourages them
to continue to push the boundaries of Bell, and now Florence.
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INTRODUCTION
Correctional facilities today house over two million' convicted and
detained inmates and have been described as 'a world of violence,' 'a
walled battlefield,' and 'Hobbesian."' 2 Despite these depressing descrip-
1. LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011).
2. Christopher P. Keleher, Judges as Jailers: The Dangerous Disconnect Between Courts
and Corrections, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 87, 87 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (quoting MATTHEW
SILBERMAN, A WORLD OF VIOLENCE 2 (1995), James E. Robertson, "Fight or F. . . " and Constitu-
tional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense When Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REV.
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tions, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that prisoners are not
beyond the reach of constitutional protections. 3 The question, however, is
how far should constitutional protections extend, and at what point does
the security of others and of the overall facility restrict personal rights?4
The constitutionality of strip-searching detained persons, including
body-cavity searches, has garnered limited attention from the Supreme
Court.s Furthermore, circuit courts have construed the limited precedent
inconsistently6 and have created standards that are irreconcilable with
controlling law. The Supreme Court in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders8 sought to add clarity by addressing a correctional facility's
intake strip search policy vis-A-vis Fourth Amendment rights.9 The Flor-
ence Court in a 5-4 decision rightly resurrected prior precedento by con-
cluding that such policies do not violate Fourth Amendment rights."
Despite this holding, however, concurring opinions by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito consider mitigating factors that will likely gar-
ner further review by courts in the years to come. These considerations
serve as viable mechanisms that may dampen the degrading effects of the
strip searches that gave the dissent pause. /
Part I of this Comment provides a brief record of Supreme Court j u-
risprudence and its various interpretations governing the constitutionality
of strip-searching detained persons. Next, Part II summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and opinions of Florence. Lastly, Part III examines
the justifications and applicability of the decision in Florence, along with
potential exceptions and how those exceptions will guide future deci-
sions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants individuals
the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures."' 2 Moreo-
ver, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "[p]rison walls do not
form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Con-
339, 341 (1995), and James E. Robertson, Surviving Incarceration: Constitutional Protection from
Inmate Violence, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 101, 102 (1985), respectively).
3. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (noting that the Court has "repeat-
edly held" prisoners maintain some constitutional rights).
4. See David M. Shapiro, Does the Fourth Amendment Permit Indiscriminate Strip Searches
ofMisdemeanor Arrestees?: Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 131,
132-33, 136 (2011).
5. Id. at 132-33 (explaining only one Supreme Court case, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), directly addresses strip-searching inmates).
6. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).
7. Keleher, supra note 2, at 89-90.
8. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
9. Id. at 1514-15.
10. Id. at 1518 (explaining that Florence "is set against this precedent and governed by the
principles announced in Turner and Belf').
11. Id. at 1523.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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stitution." 3 However, arrestees may not be "accorded those rights . . .
fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible
with the objectives of incarceration."l 4 For instance, the Supreme Court
cautions that the right to privacy in the traditional Fourth Amendment
sense may not be compatible with prison confines.15 Although the Su-
preme Court does not strictly preclude Fourth Amendment rights in such
a setting, the balance of institutional security weighs in favor of the gov-
ernment, and individual rights must therefore yield.16
A. Bell v. Wolfish17
Bell v. Wolfish is the seminal starting point to Fourth Amendment
challenges by detainees regarding their privacy, or more specifically, the
search of their persons.18 In Bell, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed sev-
eral conditions of confinement claims by detainees and convicted in-
mates of the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in New York
City.19 At issue was MCC's strip search policy requiring all detainees
partaking in contact visits with outside persons to submit to a visual
body-cavity search after every visit.20 The detainees averred that the
blanket policy infringed on their constitutional rights.2 1 Both the District
Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit
agreed.22 The Second Circuit noted that privacy is "fundamental to [the]
decent treatment of an inmate." 23 Moreover, the "gross violation of per-
sonal privacy" inflicted by the strip searches did not outweigh the "gov-
ernment's security interest." 24 In considering the "deep level of degrada-
tion and submission," the court held absent probable cause that the de-
tainees were concealing contraband, the Fourth Amendment prohibited
such searches.25
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision and con-
cluded that MCC's strip search policy did not violate the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches. 2 6 The Court noted that alt-
hough the nature of the body-cavity search caused it to "pause," in this
situation the policy was constitutional. 2 7 Furthermore, the Court conclud-
13. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
14. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984).
15. See, e.g., id. at 527-28.
16. Id.
17. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
18. Keleher, supra note 2, at 91.
19. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523.
20. Id at 558.
21. Id. at 527.
22. Id at 558.
23. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom. Bell, 441 U.S. at 520.
24. Id
25. Id (quoting United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1977)).
26. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
27. Id.
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ed that although the "test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application," courts
must balance four substantive factors: "the scope of the particular intru-
sion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating
it, and the place in which it is conducted." 28 The Court explained that
these factors "[b]alanc[e] the significant and legitimate security interests
of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates."29
In holding that the search policy was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court placed the greatest weight on the justification
factor.3 0 The Court explained that imminent security dangers represent
legitimate interests of detention facilities3 1 and justify permitting strip
searches on less than probable cause.3 2
B. Turner v. Safley33
In Turner v. Safley, a class of inmates brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of two regulations promulgated by the Missouri Divi-
34
sion of Corrections concerning prison mail and inmates' right to marry.
The questioned mail regulation limited correspondence between inmates
at separate prison facilities to only family members," and the marriage
regulation restricted inmates from marrying without direct consent of the
superintendent.3 6 The District Court for the Western District of Missouri
determined that both regulations were unconstitutional, and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.37
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the ruling as to the unconstitution-
ality of the regulation prohibiting inmates from marrying3 but reversed
the decision as to the prison-mail regulation.3 9 In its opinion, the Court
developed a standard of review for constitutional claims made by prison-
ers, 40 stating that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' consti-
tutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests." 4 1 The Court explained that its rationale was
not to "[s]ubject[] the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an in-
flexible strict scrutiny analysis" but instead to defer judgment to officials
28. Id at 559.
29. Id. at 560.
30. See id. at 559.
31. Id. (noting that "[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all too
common an occurrence").
32. Id.
33. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
34. Id. at 81-82.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 82.
37. Id. at 83.
38. Id at 99.
39. Id at 93.
40. Keleher, supra note 2, at 95.
41. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-10 (2005) (re-
fusing to apply Turner to constitutional challenges regarding a racial segregation policy).
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who are in the best position to "anticipate security problems" and "adopt
innovative solutions."42 The Court followed by holding that the policy
regulating mail correspondence between inmates ensured security at
prison facilities-a legitimate penological interest.4 3 However, the Court
declined to find an adequate penological interest in the regulation limit-
ing inmates' ability to marry.
C. The Departure from Bell v. Wolfish
In the years following Bell, ten circuit courts attempted to reconcile
the Court's finding in Bell with the strip-searching of individuals arrested
for minor offenses.4 5 These circuits held that strip searches in this in-
stance violated the Fourth Amendment absent "reasonable suspicion"
that the arrestee was hiding contraband.4 6 To provide greater protection
to detainees, these circuit courts selectively read and distinguished Bell
on varying grounds.47
In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,4 8 the Second Circuit examined
a policy requiring the strip search of female misdemeanants placed in
detention facilities of the Chicago Police Department. 49 The court ex-
plained that Bell is not controlling because the detainees in Bell were
"awaiting trial on serious federal charges" rather than being "minor of-
fenders who were not inherently dangerous."50 Furthermore, the court
noted Bell's balancing test "does not validate strip searches in detention
42. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
43. Id at 93.
44. Id. at 99.
45. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S.
Ct. 1510 (2012).
46. See Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring reasonable suspi-
cion for arrestee detained for driving under the influence), overruled by Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d
1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108, 112 (1st Cir.
2001) (requiring reasonable suspicion for an arrestee pulled over for an expired tag and detained for
an "outstanding body attachment"); Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring rea-
sonable suspicion for arrestees detained for minor offences); Maters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1253
(6th Cir. 1989) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees detained for "simple traffic violations");
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 804 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees de-
tained for misdemeanors); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
an arrestee detained for violating a leash law and who gave the officer "no other reason to suspect
[the arrestee] was harboring [contraband]" was unconstitutional); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614,
617 (9th Cir. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees detained for minor offences), over-
ruled by Bull v. City of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Hill v. Bogans, 735
F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (adopting the analysis of Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.
1981), requiring reasonable suspicion for detainees arrested for misdemeanors); Mary Beth G. v.
City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion for arrestees
detained for misdemeanors); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (requiring
reasonable suspicion for arrestees detained for driving while intoxicated).
47. See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273; see also Shapiro, supra note 4, at 140-42
(distinguishing on varying grounds, including felonies or misdemeanors, probable cause or reasona-
ble suspicion, and contact visits or arrests).
48. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).
49. Id. at 1267.
50. Id. at 1272.
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settings per se."" The court concluded that because of the "substantial
nature of the intrusions involved" and the differences depicted in Bell,
the court was justified in initiating its own inquiry as to whether the strip
search policy was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.52
Mary Beth G. is the beginning of the Bell distortion and represents
the foundation for which circuits have distinguished Bell and imparted a
reasonable suspicion standard." Commentators have noted that narrowed
interpretations like those depicted in Mary Beth G. depart from the hold-
ing in Bell and exhibit confusion,54 or blatant disregard, by circuits of
the Supreme Court's intended application.
D. The Return to Bell v. Wolfish
More recently, three circuits have resurrected Bell by finding intake
strip search policies constitutional despite the absence of reasonable sus-
picion.56 In 2008, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en bane in Powell v. Bar-
rett,57 considered a Fulton County Jail policy that required arrestees en-
tering the jail's general population to submit to a mandatory strip
search. The Powell court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
require reasonable suspicion to conduct strip searches-including a
search of body cavities-of detainees entering or re-entering general
prison population.5 9 The Eleventh Circuit noted that it and other circuits
were misguided in distinguishing Bell on the severity of an arrestee's
offense.60 The court explained that the policy upheld in Bell applies to all
inmates "regardless of whether there was any reasonable suspicion to
believe that the inmate was concealing contraband."6 ' This decision on
its own practically ended years of misapplication of Bell, and has marked
62
a turning point in the view of at least two other circuits.
Similarly, in Bull v. City of San Francisco,63 the Ninth Circuit, also
sitting en banc, reversed the district court's finding that a San Francisco
jail policy requiring all arrestees to submit to a strip search was unconsti-
tutional." The Ninth Circuit in Bull directly reversed a line of its own
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Keleher, supra note 2, at 97.
54. See Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped ofAll Reason? The Appropriate Standard for Eval-
uating Strip Searches ofArrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 36 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 163, 199 (2003).
55. See Keleher, supra note 2, at 108.
56. Id at 108-09.
57. 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
58. Id. at 1301.
59. Id. at 1307.
60. Id
61. Id.
62. See Keleher, supra note 2, at 110, 112 (stating that the Ninth Circuit "follows" Powell and
the Third Circuit "endorses" Powell).
63. 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
64. Id at 982.
565
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cases requiring reasonable suspicion and held that its prior case law was
inconsistent with Bell, Turner, and the general principles embodied in
those decisions.65 The court explained that Bell's blanket policy, which
required all inmates to submit to a mandatory strip search after contact
visits regardless of the level of suspicion, was constitutional. 66 Returning
to Bell and Turner, the court found that documented evidence of "ongo-
ing, dangerous, and perplexing" contraband in the jail represented a legit-
imate penological interest that justified the strip search policy.67 Moreo-
ver, the court warned that decisions departing from Bell and Turner were
"inconsistent with the Supreme Court's warning that federal courts must
avoid substituting their judgment for the 'professional expertise of cor-
rections officials."' 68
The basis for examining correctional strip searches promulgated in
Bell, and its subsequent resurrection by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits,
proved to be of greater precedential value to the five-Justice majority in
Florence.
II. FLORENCE V. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS
A. Facts
In 1998, officers arrested Albert Florence after he attempted to
evade arrest in Essex County, New Jersey.69 Florence was charged with
obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon, and was sentenced to
pay a fine in monthly installments.70 In 2005, a New Jersey state trooper
pulled Florence over and noticed there was an outstanding bench warrant
for his arrest.7 1 The officer arrested Florence and took him to the Bur-
lington county jail.72 The warrant, which related to an unpaid fine from
his 1998 conviction, was later determined to be erroneous because Flor-
ence had paid the fine in 2003.73
Before admittance to the general population at the Burlington coun-
ty jail (Burlington), Florence was required to shower with a delousing
agent and submit to a strip search to be checked for scars, gang tattoos,
and contraband.74 This process included lifting his genitals for visual
inspection.75 Six days later, officers transferred Florence to the Essex
County Correctional Facility (Essex), New Jersey's largest county jail.76
65. Id at 980.
66. Id. at 975.
67. Id at 977.
68. Id at 980 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979)).
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Similar to that of Burlington, Essex's policy required all incoming de-
tainees, regardless of the circumstances, to submit to a strip search.7 7 The
search required visual inspection of all body cavities, including a genital
lift and a process in which the detainee squatted and coughed . Charges
were dismissed the following day, and Florence was released.79
B. Procedural History
Florence sought relief from multiple defendants under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.80 He asserted that the Constitution prohibits correctional facilities
from mandating the strip search of those arrested for minor offenses ab-
sent reasonable suspicion of concealed contraband.8 ' The New Jersey
district court, following a majority of circuits,82 distinguished Bell and
granted Florence's motion for summary judgment.13
On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.84 In its holding, the Third Circuit rejected the district
court's narrow interpretation of Bell and concluded that the strip search
policies reasonably balanced the security needs of the facilities and Flor-
ence's personal rights.85 The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiora-
86ri.
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision, the Court framed the issue as "whether every de-
tainee who will be admitted to the general population may be required to
undergo a close visual inspection while undressed."87 In an opinion au-
thored by Justice Kennedy-and joined in whole by Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justices Alito and Scalia, and in all but Part IV of the opinion by
Justice Thomas-the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's deci-
sion, holding that such strip search polices were constitutional.8
The Court's underlying theme was institutional security,89 premised
on three tenants specific to correctional facilities: (1) "substantial discre-





81. Id. at 1514-15.
82. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 147.




87. Id. at 1513.
88. Id. at 1523.
89. See id at 1513 ("Correctional officials have a legitimate interest . . . to ensure jails are not
made less secure.").
90. Id. at 1515-16.
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against the "resulting invasion of personal rights"; 91 and (3) the "ability
to conduct searches without predictable exceptions."92 The Court ex-
plained that without substantial evidence that correctional officials' re-
sponse was exaggerated, the governing standard required deference to
correctional expertise. 9 3
In its holding, the Florence Court placed its greatest emphasis on
the Bell balancing test, weighing the need for the search against the inva-
sion of personal rights.94 In characterizing the need and the resulting jus-
tifications, Justice Kennedy enumerated risks such as wounds and infec-
tions, gang markings and affiliations, and contraband that the strip
searches in question would reveal.95 The Court held that despite the inva-
sion on Florence's personal rights, there was a "substantial interest" in
alleviating these risks before individuals reached a jail's general popula-
tion in order to protect others in the facility.96 Moreover, Justice Kennedy
noted that "[tihe difficulties of operating a detention facility should not
be underestimated" 97 and explained that officials deserve latitude to form
policies that detect and deter the entrance of contraband.9 8
As to Florence's contention that people arrested for minor crimes
must be exempted from strip searches absent reasonable suspicion, the
Court concluded that neither the Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires such a standard.99 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the differing
views among circuits on this issue but stressed the importance of re-
establishing the foundational rules set forth in Bell and Turner.00
The Florence Court's rationale for declining to adopt a reasonable
suspicion standard is based on two premises. 0' First, Justice Kennedy
explained that the severity of an offense is an inadequate predictor of
those who have contraband, noting that "[p]eople detained for minor
offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals."'O2
The Court pointed to examples in which some of the most dangerous and
hardened criminals were stopped for minor driving infractions during the
midst of grievous criminal activity. 03 Moreover, Justice Kennedy ex-
91. Id. at 1516.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1518 (setting forth the standard promulgated in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576,
584-85 (1984)).
94. Id. at 1521 (explaining that exempting people arrested for minor offenses would increase
both the risk to others and of contraband).
95. Id at 1518-19.
96. Id. at 1520.
97. Id at 1515 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987)).
98. Id at 1517.
99. Id. at 1514-15, 1523.
100. See id at 1518.
101. See id. at 1520-21.
102. Id. at 1520.
103. Id. (noting that hours before the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was pulled
over by a state trooper for driving without a license plate and that a terrorist associated with the 9/11
attacks was ticketed for speeding just two days prior to the attacks).
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plamied that exempting those detained for minor offenses would encour-
age experienced detainees to enlist outsiders to bring in contraband or
weapons.'" He opined that the resulting effect would be coercion by,
those in superior positions.'0o
Second, the Court noted that classifying arrestees by current and
prior offenses would be difficult at the time of the search due to incom-
plete or inaccurate identifying information.'0 6 Consequently, the lack of
information is contrary to a central principle set forth in Atwater v. City
ofLago Vista'ov that "[o]fficers who interact with those suspected of vio-
lating the law have an 'essential interest in readily administrable
rules."' 08 The Court also sympathized with correctional officials' posi-
tion against a "complicated constitutional scheme requiring them to con-
duct less thorough inspections of some detainees based on their behavior,
suspected offense, criminal history, and other factors." 09
Lastly, Part IV of the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia and Alito, reserved several questions that were not at is-
sue in Atwater."o The first question reserved was whether a strip search
violates the Fourth Amendment when "a detainee will be held without
assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact
with other detainees.""' The second was whether "an arrestee whose
detention has not been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer,
and who can be held in available facilities removed from the general
population, may be subjected to the types of searches at issue here." 1 2
D. ChiefJustice Roberts's and Justice Alito's Concurring Opinions
In separate concurring opinions, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito emphasized the importance of not foreclosing exceptions to the
Court's holding.1 13 Chief Justice Roberts noted that Florence's arrest was
for an outstanding warrant, and there were no other alternatives to gen-
eral-population detention.1 4 Due to the particular facts of the case, there
was no opportunity to consider exceptions to the rule proffered by the
Court. 1 However, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Court is
104. Id. at 1521.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
108. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522 (quoting Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347).
109. Id
110. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522-23 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas did not join in Part IV
of the opinion.
111. Id. at 1522.
112. Id. at 1523.
113. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Court is "wise to leave open the
possibility of exceptions"); id at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating "the Court does not hold that it
is always reasonable" to strip-search an arrestee).
114. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
115. Id.
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"wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions" but acknowledged that
the Court "makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the
rule."l 16
Justice Alito went a step further and detailed possible mitigating
factors, stating that "the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable
to conduct a full strip search."' 17 First, he explained that the majority's
holding might not apply to scenarios where there are feasible alternative
holding facilities available for those arrested for minor crimes.'" For
example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons requires the segregation of ar-
restees for some minor offenses from a jail's general population.11 9 Sec-
ond, Justice Alito pointed out that the majority opinion explicitly re-
serves the question of the reasonableness of a strip search of an arrestee
- - 120
prior to review by a judicial officer.
E. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, sharply criticized the Court's
holding by proclaiming that "such a search of an individual arrested for a
minor offense ... is an 'unreasonable searc[h]' forbidden by the Fourth
Amendment, unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve the individual possesses drugs or other contraband." 2 1 Justice
Breyer's criticism focused on the degradation of the type of search that
Florence was subjected to, specifically the genital lift and "squat cough-
ing," explaining that such searches are "harmful, humiliating, and de-
grading."1 22 Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Bell balancing test was
the "applicable standard"1 2 3 ; however, he explained that unlike the ma-
jority's reasoning, the "invasion of personal rights here is very serious
and lacks need or justification." 24
In addressing the Court's justifications, the dissent concluded that
the risks proffered by the Court-wounds and infections, gang markings
and affiliations, and contraband-were not "legitimate penological inter-
ests" requiring deferral to correctional expertise.125 Justice Breyer ex-
116. Id
117. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
118. Id
119. Id.
120. Id at 1525. Justice Alito cited Part IV of the opinion for support of this contention. De-
spite Part IV's limited endorsement by the Florence Court, it is likely that the contentions set forth
therein represent a controlling view by the Court, taking into consideration the dissenting Justices.
Therefore, Justice Alito's concurrence likely takes on greater precedential value considering its
general acceptance among at least seven Justices of the Court.
121. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original).
122. Id. at 1525-26.
123. Id. at 1526.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1527-28 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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plained the first two risks could be addressed through less invasive
searches such as pat-downs, metal detectors, making inmates shower in
delousing agents, and searching inmates' clothing.12 6
As to the contraband, Justice Breyer recognized that the lack of j us-
tification was "less obvious" but determined that it was "no less real." 27
Justice Breyer divided his response to the majority's contraband risk into
three parts.12 8 First, he criticized the majority's reliance on security justi-
fications by pointing to multiple empirical studies that suggested the lev-
el of contraband risk would not increase if more invasive strip search
procedures were eliminated.129 Second, he explained that there was a
"plethora" of correctional associations and other professional organiza-
tions that have "promulgated a standard that forbids suspicionless strip
searches,"o30 and many correctional facilities already apply a reasonable
suspicion standard to general-population inmates. 31 Third, Justice Brey-
er pointed to at least ten states and seven courts of appeals that have con-
sidered and adopted a reasonable suspicion standard.132 The dissent con-
cluded its analysis of Justice Kennedy's justifications by noting that the
Court is only "left with the word of prison officials in support of its con-
trary proposition."' 33
As for Bell, the Florence dissent distinguished the seminal case by
explaining that the arrestees in Bell, in comparison to Florence, were a
"greater risk to jail security" and had time to plan to smuggle contra-
band. 134 Justice Breyer noted that "[t]he Bell Court had no occasion to
focus upon those arrested for minor crimes, prior to a judicial officer's
determination that they should be committed to prison."' 35 Justice Breyer
opined that it would be "highly questionable that officials would be justi-
126. Id. at 1528.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1527-28.
129. Id. at 1528-29. In support, the dissent noted a study by the New York federal district court
in which 23,000 arrestees were strip-searched between 1999 and 2003 at the Orange County correc-
tional facility. Id. at 1528. Of the 23,000 searched, five were found to possess contraband-three in
their anal cavities and two in their underwear. Id. The study found that of the five instances, "there
may have been 'reasonable suspicion' to search" the arrestees in four of the cases. Id. (quoting
Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d. 41, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). Also, the dissent noted a study
produced in Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 2001). Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1528-29. That
study analyzed 75,000 strip searches of new inmates that occurred over a period of five years. Id at
1529. Of the 75,000, sixteen instances led to the discovery of contraband. Id Based on the record,
thirteen instances would have been detected through less invasive searches such as a pat-down. Id
Of the three remaining instances, "there was a drug or felony history that would have justified a strip
search on individualized reasonable suspicion." Id
130. Id. at 1529.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1529-30.
133. Id at 1531.
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fled" in directing those arrested for minor crimes into the "dangerous
world of the general jail population." 36
Lastly, Justice Breyer cited Justice Alito's concurring opinion, not-
ing Justice Alito's reservations about searches before an arrestee's deten-
tion has been reviewed by a judicial officer.137 He concluded that the
issue "remains open."l 3 8
III. ANALYSIS
The U.S. Supreme Court in Florence properly took the first step to
reign in circuits departing from established Fourth Amendment precedent
governing detainee search processes. Despite the humiliating burdens
these processes carry, 139 the Court found greater weight in penological
interests related to correctional-officer discretion and heightened security
needs.14 0 The Court's emphasis on deference to correction officials plac-
es difficult security issues in the hands of those with the greatest exper-
tise and allows for adaptive, rather than reactive, policies. Moreover, by
upholding the blanket strip search policies in Florence, the Court pro-
tected the deterrent effect of strip searches and emphasized the protection
of many over the rights of a single individual. Lastly, in striking down a
reasonable suspicion standard, the Florence Court correctly highlighted
the inadequacies of basing bright-line search rules on the seriousness of
the offense charged. 14 1
Although the majority upheld the constitutionality of the intake strip
search policies in Florence, questions remain unanswered. For instance,
Justice Alito's concurrence raised issues left dormant in the majority
opinion that may act as mitigating factors to the Court's holding. Fur-
thermore, as technology continues to advance, the need for strip searches
like those at issue in Florence will be greatly diminished.
A. The Realities ofDiminished Privacy During Detention and Its Justifi-
cations
Although detainees retain some constitutional rights once commit-
ted to correctional facilities, 142 the "[f]oss of freedom of choice and pri-
vacy are inherent incidents of confinement."l 43 Supreme Court precedent
136. Id. at 1532. In justifying its position, the dissent relied heavily on the question of the
constitutionality of committing to a jail's general population those arrested for minor offenses. As
the dissent noted, "[l]t remains open for the Court to consider whether it would be reasonable to
admit an arrestee for a minor offense to the general jail population." Id.
137. Id. at 1531-32.
138. Id. at 1532.
139. See id. at 1526.
140. Id. at 1515 (majority opinion) (maintaining that safety and order requires the expertise of
detention officials).
141. Id. at 1520.
142. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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justifying the invasion of privacy by strip-searching detainees can be
grouped into two categories: correctional officers' need for discretion'44
and security interests.14 5
1. Correctional Officers' Need for Discretion
Judicial deference to correctional officials is rooted in the doctrine
of separation of powers.14 6 The "unifying theme" among Supreme Court
cases such as Bell, Turner, and Block v. Rutherford 47 has been to defer
to correctional expertise rather than to force stricter alternatives.14" As
noted in Turner, operating detention facilities is inherently difficult and
requires specific expertise 4 9 that "courts are ill equipped to deal with."so
Despite the call for deference, the Supreme Court does recognize that
deference to correctional expertise has its limits. For instance, the Su-
preme Court has consistently held that prison walls do not absolve con-
stitutional protections.'
a. Who Is in the Best Position and with the Greatest Exper-
tise?
The Florence Court, in finding the intake strip search policies con-
stitutional, correctly held that correctional officials must be given defer-
ence to implement reasonable search policies that detect and deter con-
traband.152 To support the holding, the Court deferred policy-making
authority to government officials in the best position and with the great-
est expertise.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that there are inherent op-
erational difficulties within correctional facilities and has concluded that
they are not amenable to easy solutions.15 3 Moreover, maintaining safety
and order within correctional facilities is a fundamental requirement in
promoting effective detention.154 As the Florence Court noted, respond-
144. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 90 (1987) (explaining that running a prison is
difficult and requires expertise and planning).
145. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 ("A detention facility is ... fraught with serious security dangers.");
see also Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1512 (majority opinion) (noting that the admission of detainees
creates numerous risks).
146. Keleher, supra note 2, at 115.
147. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
148. Keleher, supra note 2, at 117.
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85.
150. Id. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
151. E.g., id.
152. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012).
153. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
154. See id.at 546.
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ing to these difficulties, while ensuring effective detention, requires the
"expertise of correctional officials."155
In reliance on this expertise, the Supreme Court has directed that
correction officials be accorded "wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices."' 56 Furthermore, the Court has
explained that the judgment of correctional officials enables the preser-
vation of "internal order and discipline" and "institutional security"
needs.'57 Accordingly, Supreme Court precedent rightly recognizes the
day-to-day difficulties of running correctional facilities and directs lower
courts to provide general deference to correctional officials, allowing
them to apply their expertise to ensure security. The Florence Court
rightly found credence in these principles and stressed the importance of
allowing correctional officials the autonomy to manage operations, in-
cluding the right to effectively and reasonably enforce blanket strip
search policies. 58
b. The Need for Adaptive, Rather Than Reactive, Policies
Deferring authority to officials inside correctional facilities allows
for adaptive policies that evolve with the ever-changing dynamics of a
correctional environment. There are over 5,000 prisons in the United
States with no two prisons alike, as each is made up of different de-
mographics.159 Moreover, as the nation's population continues to grow
and America's social norms change, so does the "internal society" within
correctional facilities.16 0
Because of the numerous moving parts correctional officials face on
a daily basis, the importance of deference in general policy-making au-
thority is paramount. Given the dissimilarities among correctional facili-
ties and the array of purposes served, correctional officials' ability to
conform policies within narrow judicial standards would be both difficult
and impractical. Correctional deference must continue to be amenable to
reasonable judicial review; however, as in Florence, courts must provide
latitude to those with subject-matter expertise absent substantial evidence
of an exaggerated response. Additionally, beyond correctional officials'
need for deference, the courts involvement in the "day-to-day manage-
155. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515 ("Maintaining safety and order at [correctional] institutions
requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise rea-
sonable solutions to the problems they face.").
156. Bell, 441 U.S. at 521.
157. Id. at 547.
158. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517.
159. John J. Gibbons & Nicholas De B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report of the
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 385, 398 (2006).
160. Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, American Criminal Justice Philosophy: What's
Old-What's New?, 63 FED. PROBATION 62, 65 (1999). The authors noted that the population in
prisons quintupled between 1975 and 1995. Id. The authors also noted that during the 1970s and
early 1980s prison riots were a common occurrence leading correctional officials to "limit[] or
eliminate[] activities not seen as absolutely necessary." Id.
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ment of prisons" is a "squandering [of] judicial resources with little off-
setting benefit to anyone."' Allowing correctional facilities to proac-
tively adapt policies to current needs serves both the effectiveness of
detention and the preservation of scarce judicial resources.
c. The Cost in Relation to the Proposed Benefit
The final rationale for deference to correctional expertise is correc-
tional officials' inherent ability to weigh a policy's cost in relation to the
proposed benefit. Basic economic theory stipulates that when the cost of
policy changes exceeds the proposed benefit, the policy should not be
enforced.16 2 Moreover, correctional officials are in the best position to
examine both the monetary and personnel cost against the likely benefits
of policy changes.'6 3 Understandably, Florence properly noted that
courts must continue to be the arbiter of personal rights; however, when
the cost associated with maintaining those rights reaches unattainable
levels, the courts must defer to correctional expertise.'6
Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Phelan65
noted that there are always "[1]ess-restrictive-altemative arguments." 6 6
For example, the court explained, "[A] prison always can do something,
at some cost, to make prisons more habitable." 67 However, Judge
Easterbrook concluded that if "courts assess and compare these costs and
benefits then judges rather than wardens are the real prison administra-
tors." 6 8 Although the Florence Court did not directly address the point in
a monetary context, the Court's resurrection of the principles in Bell em-
phasizes fundamental jurisprudence that "judges [must] respect [the]
hard choices made by prison officials." 6 9 By allowing correctional offi-
cials to maintain broad control over detention policies, courts will facili-
tate an environment that freely adapts to changing correctional dynamics,
while maintaining economic efficiency.
2. Security Interest
Beginning with Bell, the Supreme Court has placed added emphasis
on the justification factor in determining the balance between the requi-
site need and an invasion of personal rights.170 Consistently, justification
161. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995).
162. E. Thomas Sullivan & Brian A. Marks, The FTC's Deceptive Advertising Policy: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REv. 593, 623-24 (1986).
163. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995).
164. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522 (2012) ("The restrictions
suggested by petitioner would limit the intrusion on the privacy of some detainees but at the risk of
increased danger to everyone in the facility . . .
165. 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
166. Id at 145.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id; see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
170. E.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012).
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has been anchored in the basic tenet that security is a necessary condition
for effective detention.17 1 The Court in Florence extended that logic and
rightly affirmed precedent that ensures the security of the entire institu-
tional setting.
a. The Safety of Many over the Personal Rights of an Individ-
ual
The Florence Court began its security-justification analysis by ex-
plaining that "[t]he admission of inmates creates numerous risks for fa-
cility staff, for the existing detainee population, and for a new detain-
ee."l 72 The Court pointed out that the need for heightened security is the
greatest at the initial point of contact with a detention facility7 3 and
enumerated specific risks that intake strip search policies seek to pre-
clude.174
Although the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment does not "mandate comfortable prisons," 1 5 the Eighth Amend-
ment does impart upon correctional facilities an obligation to care for
detained persons when they are deprived of the liberty to care for them-
selves.'76 To ensure the greatest level of security and care to inmates,
blanket strip search policies are enforced for the protection of the very
detainees who now challenge the constitutionality of such policies. 177
Numerous judicial opinions have documented the alarming rates of vio-
lence among inmates in correctional facilities. 78 This increased violence,
in part, is exacerbated by the availability of contraband, which plays a
significant role in inmate-on-inmate violence.' 79 By not foreclosing cor-
rectional officials' ability to use blanket strip search policies, the Court
correctly concluded that a single right of a single individual does not
supersede the rights of the detained population as a whole.
The final beneficiaries of blanket strip search policies are the men
and women who work at correctional facilities each day. The Supreme
Court accepts that "[p]risons are dangerous places."' 80 However, as
commentators have noted, just because prisons house dangerous people
171. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (maintaining that security in prisons is
an essential goal).
172. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.
173. Keleher, supra note 2, at 115 ("Security interests are strongest when a detainee enters a
correctional facility.").
174. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 (noting "disease, gang affiliations, and contraband").
175. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
349 (1981)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
176. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1989).
177. Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1988).
178. Keleher, supra note 2, at 126-27 (noting multiple examples of violence, including a
Florida jail reporting 150 assaults among 600 inmates in eleven months, another detention facility
reporting 330 incidents of violence among 650 inmates during one year, and a Tennessee jail report-
ing 685 incidents of violence among 2,300 inmates in six months).
179. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993).
180. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).
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does not mean that prisons have to be dangerous places.'8 ' The level of
danger is a direct by-product of the mode of operation, including blanket
strip search policies.182 Correctional officers are at the heart of facility
operations and interact daily with those incarcerated for a multitude of
reasons. This begs the question whether judges, who are far removed
from the realities of prison life, should prohibit security measures meant
to protect those on the front line. The Florence Court answered in the
negative.18 3 Blanket strip search policies ensure institutional security and
safeguard correctional officials against unnecessary danger due to dimin-
ished security protocols.
b. Deterrent Effect and the Manipulation of the System
The Florence Court noted that blanket strip search policies detect
and deter the entrance of contraband, protecting all involved, including
guards and other detainees.' 84 As did the Court in Bell, the Florence
Court relied on deterrence to shift the balance and justify a finding that
the strip search policies were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' 85
However, the Florence dissent'" and others 87 have opined that the de-
terrent effect in Florence is distinguishable from Bell because those ar-
rested for minor offenses have inadequate time to plan to smuggle con-
traband. The parties expressing these opinions greatly discount the abili-
ties of a criminal mind. For instance, the Florence Court aptly explained
that exempting certain detainees from strip searches before entry would
encourage "experienced" detainees to manipulate the system in order to
obtain contraband. 88
Admittedly, Florence was not likely plotting to bring in contraband,
and further, such plots may not frequently occur. However, the Florence
Court was correct in finding that inmates will seek to take advantage of
loopholes created without the enforcement of blanket strip search poli-
cies. Moreover, correctional officials' inability to enforce blanket poli-
cies would greatly diminish the level of deterrence, resulting in an in-
crease in security breaches. The effectiveness of blanket policies like
those at issue in Florence depends on the foreclosure of predictable ex-
ceptions.'89 The Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer190 explained that
181. See, e.g., Donald Specter, Making Prisons Safe: Strategies for Reducing Violence, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 125, 126 (2006).
182. Id.
183. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012).
184. Id
185. See id.
186. Id at 1531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Amanda Laufer, Comment, The Pendulum Continues to Swing in the Wrong
Direction and the Fourth Amendment Moves Closer to the Edge of the Pit: The Rarnifications of
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 383, 414 (2012).
188. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522 (majority opinion).
189. Id at 1516.
190. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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stipulating that prison searches can only be conducted pursuant to a gen-
eral policy "ignore[s] the realities of prison operation[s]."l 9' By banning
predictable exceptions that inmates may take advantage of, as in Flor-
ence, courts enable strip search policies to maintain their integrity and
maximum deterrent effect. The result of such measures is added security,
translating into further protection for all who come into contact with the
correctional facility.
c. Contraband and the Correctional Facility's Underground
Economy
Finally, although the level of danger can be minimized in correc-
tional facilities, the reality is that some facilities are dangerous places
housing dangerous people. With no form of status other than potential
affiliations with other inmates, detainees sometimes look to contraband
as a form of protection, manipulation, and currency.192 With contraband
forming the basis of this underground economy, one can envision detain-
ees exploiting the system to obtain forbidden items.
The form of contraband does not have to be inherently dangerous to
pose a threat to a correctional facility. 19 3 Correctional officers describe
the use of contraband as a currency, whereby inmates barter and sell con-
traband for "[other] contraband, favors, services, or even money." 9 4 The
trade of drugs makes up a large part of the economy and "command[s] a
high price within ... jail[s]." Moreover, the trade of contraband is not
limited to drug users; an officer familiar with the trade of contraband has
noted that even non-drug users are encouraged to trade as a form of pro-
tecting themselves or obtaining other valuable items.'96 Consequently,
the trade of contraband inside prison walls creates distinct classes-those
who have and those who have not.1 97 The "skewed general order" of
prisons' social structure as a result of contraband creates dangerous or
even deadly tension between and among fellow inmates and staff.198
A contraband specialist who worked for twenty-six years in a cor-
rectional setting noted, "The vast majority of inmates . . . are familiar
with the jail operations and know that they are going to be strip searched
191. Id at 529 (quoting Marrero v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 809, 811 (Va. 1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
192. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1519 (noting the value of contraband in an underground economy).
193. Johannes v. Alameda Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. C04-458MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63378, at *14k15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2006) (quoting a contraband specialist who explained that it is
important to control contraband whether it is a dangerous item or a "seemingly innocuous" item).
194. Id. at *15.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41,47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
198. Brief for Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
11, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 3808399,
at *ll [hereinafter Amici-Respondents BriefJ.
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when they first enter the jail population . . . ."199 Moreover, inmates have
adequate time on their hands "to plot and scheme." 200 Given the value
and protection that contraband can carry, it is not unreasonable to imag-
ine instances in which inmates might coerce others to smuggle contra-
band into correctional facilities. If the Court in Florence had adopted the
view of the dissent, whereby certain arrestees would be constitutionally
exempt from strip searches, then inmates inside correctional facilities
would be encouraged to game the system and use those who are inferior
on the outside as their pawns. The result of operational loopholes would
be an increase in contraband and a compromise of institutional security
as a whole.
B. The Fallacies of the Dissent's Rationale
1. Mandating a "Reasonable Suspicion" Standard
The Florence dissent chastised the Court for declining to adopt a
reasonable suspicion standard for strip-searching those arrested for minor
crimes.201 The dissent explained there is no convincing evidence that "in
the absence of reasonable suspicion, involuntary strip searches of those
arrested for minor offenses are necessary in order to further the penal
interests." 202 Justice Breyer supported his lack of "penal interest" claim
by citing to empirical studies and noting that several correctional facili-
ties already require reasonable suspicion before strip-searching those
arrested for minor offenses.203
The Florence dissent, in advocating a reasonable suspicion standard
for those arrested for "minor offenses," would have required officers to
conduct a series of steps before justifying the strip search of a detain-
ee.204 First, the dissent would have required officers to conduct a pat-
down or a search of the arrestee's outer clothing.205 If an initial search
indicated added suspicion, then a strip search would be justified. Second,
an officer would have been required to review an arrestee's prior arrest
record to determine if there was cause (e.g., a felony history) to initiate a
strip search.206 Each of these factors disregard controlling precedent
enunciated in Bell and would facilitate increased discretion to officers,
leading to possible discrimination and other legal difficulties.
199. Johannes v. Alameda Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, No. C04-458MHP, 2006 WL 2504400, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006).
.200. Amici-Respondents Brief, supra note 198.
201. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1528 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1529.
204. Id. (explaining that a pat-down, search of outer clothing and shoes, or felony history may
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a. Reasonable Suspicion Is Not Reconcilable with Bell
Reading a reasonable suspicion standard into the Constitution for
those arrested for minor offenses fails to leverage correctional officials'
expertise, limits available remedies, and contradicts Supreme Court prec-
edent..207 Lower courts have interpreted Bell to mandate reasonable sus-
picion before justifying a strip search; 208 however, such a reading is in-
consistent with Bell and the Fourth Amendment.209 In fact, Bell stands
for just the opposite. 210 Bell addressed a blanket strip search policy that
applied to all detainees following contact visits regardless of any reason-
able suspicion. 2 1 1 The Eleventh Circuit has provided the greatest context
to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Bell: "When the Court stated
that 'these searches' do not violate the Fourth Amendment, it obviously
meant the searches that were before it, and those searches were conduct-
ed under a blanket policy without reasonable suspicion. It really is that
simple."212
The Florence Court took great effort to document the split among
circuits as to the requirement of reasonable suspicion for arrestees de-
tained for minor crimes.213 In doing so, the Court highlighted the depar-
ture from Bell through the lower courts' narrow interpretation. Although
the Florence Court's resurrection of Bell may be restricted somewhat by
the further defining of the mitigating factors exposed in the concurring
opinions, the proposition holds that those arrested for minor offenses are
given no preferential treatment if their destination is a jail's general pop-
ulation. Such a holding is the most plausible reading of precedent and
rightly corrects years of misapplication of Bell by multiple circuit courts.
b. Reasonable Suspicion Is an Unreasonable Expectation for
Officers
Mandating that the Fourth Amendment require reasonable suspicion
before searching arrestees for minor offenses has significant negative
effects, especially on the officers required to comply with the heightened
214standard. For instance, officers regularly have incomplete information
during intake as to the circumstances surrounding an arrestee's arrest
because the processing officer in most cases is different from the arrest-
ing officer.2 15 Furthermore, the way arrestees enter correctional facilities
207. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison officials must be free to take appropri-
ate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel .. . .").
208. E.g., Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]o be reasonable under [Bell],
strip and visual body cavity searches must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee is concealing contraband or weapons.").
209. Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008).
210. Id
211. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
212. Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 558).
213. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012).
214. Keleher, supra note 2, at 121.
215. Id.
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varies, making it difficult to track fact-specific determinations required to
find reasonable suspicion.216 Consequently, reasonable suspicion from an
officer's perspective should not even be a question when an arrestee's
destination is a jail's general population. Those committed to the jail's
general population are searched because they are entering highly secured
facilities, not for the factual nuances underlying what they have done.
c. Reasonable Suspicion Promotes Unpredictable and Dis-
criminatory Practices
The Florence Court correctly concluded that if a reasonable suspi-
cion standard were implemented, "[t]he laborious administration of pris-
ons would become less effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded." 2 17
The Supreme Court is not the first to stress the importance of removing
discretionary decision-making authority from officers for strip search-
es.218 The Third Circuit in Florence held that the implementation of
blanket policies subjects arrestees to the same, consistent policy and di-
minishes correctional facilities' liability for equal protection issues. 2 19
Eliminating discretionary standards not only reduces liability for correc-
tional institutions but also decreases the likelihood of discriminatory and
retaliatory acts as a result of case-by-case standards. Courts have de-
scribed the reasonable suspicion standard as "lines drawn by courts" that
tend to be "ambiguous, subject to manipulation and difficult to adminis-
ter.220 In response to the operational difficulties, officers are encouraged
to forgo searches in close cases, thereby leading to a decrease in liability
216. Id Arrestees enter correctional facilities under differing circumstances. For instance, an
arrestee may enter as a single admit, or as part of a larger group. Similarly, arrestees may be booked
under a variety procedural directives, i.e., by the arresting officer or by another officer upon arrival
at the correctional facility. These varying circumstances pose an immediate problem to officers
applying a reasonable suspicion standard. See id. As the circumstances change from admit to admit,
it becomes increasingly difficult to regularly, and consistently, apply the fact-specific determinations
that form the basis of the reasonable suspicion standard. See id.
217. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1521.
218. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 310 (3d Cir. 2010), aff'd, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (2012). The Third Circuit described the risk associated with a reasonable suspicion standard as
"high, particularly where reasonable suspicion may be based on such subjective characteristics as the
arrestee's appearance and conduct at the time of arrest." Id. at 310-11.
219. Id
220. Bull v. City of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 984 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concur-
ring). Chief Judge Kozinski paralleled the adoption of a reasonable suspicion standard to recent
substantive changes to commercial airline searches. As he described:
Treating everyone who gets on a commercial plane the same is simple: If you want to get
on a plane, you take off your shoes, leave behind any liquids over three ounces, remove
your laptop from its carrying case and pass through the metal detector-no exceptions. If
we were to order an exemption for the least risky segments of the population, we'd have
to worry about how to identify those people-that is, what kind of screening we'd have to
set up to make sure no fakers get into the system-and then, at the point of entry, we'd
have to confirm that the people presenting themselves for boarding were, in fact, the ones
cleared in advance. The operation, and recent failure, of the Clear system (which let you
cut to the front of the line but otherwise didn't exempt you from much of anything)
showed that kind of exemption is difficult and costly to administer, and results in a lot of
dirty looks from those you cut in front of.
Id. at 984-85.
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but an increase in security breaches. 22 ' Lastly, the removal of discretion
from the operational level in correctional facilities furthers the general
rule of deference to correctional expertise as set forth in Bell and Turner.
2. The Severity of an Offense Is an Inadequate Standard
Both the Florence dissent22 2 and legal scholars223 suggest that poli-
cies governing intake strip search procedures should be determined based
on the underlying offense. This Comment endorses the Florence
Court's 224 explicit disagreement with that assertion. Furthermore, this
Comment seeks to take the Florence decision a step further2 25 and estab-
lish that a detainee's ultimate destination is the determinative factor
when considering the constitutionality of blanket strip search policies.
As described in Florence, a detainee's underlying charge is a poor
and often inaccurate predictor of the level of harm or the likelihood of
concealed contraband. 22 6 To minimize the security risk, courts should
instead look to an arrestee's destination to determine the permissible
level of personal invasion. By focusing on where the arrestee is going,
correctional officials are able to easily distinguish and segregate those
who need more invasive searches from those who do not. In Florence,
for instance, correctional personnel subjected Florence to the jail's gen-
eral population.2 27 Therefore, regardless of the potential charge, an ar-
restee in Florence's position should be required to submit to an invasive
strip search solely because his ultimate destination is the general popula-
tion. Following this line of reasoning is most analogous to Supreme
Court precedent focusing on penological interests and resurrects founda-
tional rules promulgated in Bell.
Supporters of the level-of-the-offense standard suggest that officials
should segregate arrestees on the severity of the offense charged.228
However, a blanket rule mandating the segregation of those arrested for
221. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1522. Admittedly, the doctrine of qualified immunity often pre-
cludes officer liability; however, there are instances where the predictability of blanket policies will
further reduce overall liability. See id. For example, standardized processes decrease the likelihood
of retaliatory acts by officers that are likely outside the realm of qualified immunity.
222. Id. at 1526 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 153.
224. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 (noting that detainees arrested for minor offenses can be
dangerous criminals).
225. The facts in Florence were limited in that (i) Florence was not arrested prior to judicial
review, and (ii) there were no available holding facilities at either correctional facility in question in
the case. Because the facts in Florence were not conducive to Justice Alito's exceptions, the Court
explained that it was restricted from considering the narrow exceptions. Id at 1523. This Comment
reaches beyond the factual nuances of Florence and seeks to examine and opine on the legitimacy of
the potential exceptions raised by Justice Alito.
226. See id at 1520; see also Clements v. Logan, 454 U.S. 1304, 1305 (1981) (explaining that
the facility enacted its intake strip search policy following the shooting of a deputy by an unsearched
misdemeanant).
227. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514.
228. Id. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating it is questionable that persons arrested for
minor crimes should be committed to the general population).
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minor offenses from the general population is impractical from an opera-
tional perspective. To date, pivotal Supreme Court cases addressing de-
tainee strip search policies have pertained only to larger metropolitan
correctional facilities. 22 9 The economic reality is, however, that smaller,
rural correctional facilities often do not have the resources to maintain
multiple units to segregate different classifications of detainees. For ex-
ample, a rural county with a small population likely only maintains a
single jail facility. That facility will hold both convicted inmates and
temporary detainees. If correctional officials in this example were re-
quired to follow a "level of the offense" standard, then arrestees for mi-
nor offenses would have the opportunity to introduce dangerous contra-
band into the facility. In sum, adopting strict rules as proffered by the
Florence dissent would force rural correctional officials to choose be-
tween risking constitutional claims for noncompliance or allowing poten-
tially dangerous detainees to infiltrate the general jail population without
adequate search policies.
It should be noted that this Comment does not opine that it is always
reasonable to commit those arrested for minor offenses to the general
population. This Comment only concludes that it is impractical to man-
date correctional facilities with different levels of operational and eco-
nomic capabilities to require segregation. Consequently, the question
remains whether it is constitutional to commit to the general population,
and thus strip-search, one who has been arrested for a minor offense
where alternative holding facilities are available.23 0
C. Possible Exceptions and Their Likely Outcomes
The concurring opinions of Chief Justice Roberts231 and Justice
Alito23 2 in Florence, as well as Justice Breyer's dissent,23 3 all alluded to
future exceptions to the Court's decision to uphold the intake strip search
policy. Although the concurring opinions offer possible exceptions to the
Court's holding, neither concurrence acts as a defining mechanism to the
holding. Instead, each simply seeks to highlight potential mitigating cir-
cumstances that may influence the Court under the right set of facts. 23 4
Both concurrences and the dissent detailed two possible exceptions: fea-
sible alternative holding facilitieS235 and arrestees whose detentions lack
229. Id. at 1514 (noting that the Essex County Correctional Facility is the largest county jail in
New Jersey); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979) (noting that the Metropolitan Correctional
Center is in New York City).
230. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring); see also discussion infra Part III.C.2.
231. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C. J., concurring).
232. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
234. Justice Alito explained, "The Court holds that jail administrators may require all arrestees
who are committed to the general population of a jail to undergo visual strip searches . . . ." Id. at
1524 (Alito, J. concurring). However, he also asserted that "the Court does not hold that it is always
reasonable to conduct a full strip search" and followed by detailing possible mitigating factors. Id
235. Id. at 1524.
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236judicial review. In addition to the exceptions provided by the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, this Comment explores a third possible
exception: the emergence of new technologies.
1. Arrestees Whose Detention Lack Judicial Review
Justice Breyer concluded his dissent in Florence by underlining the
preserved issue of whether it would be reasonable for an arrestee to sub-
mit to a strip search prior to review by a judicial officer. 23 7 Justice Alito
expressed a similar reservation in his concurrence.2 38 Considering that
Florence's arrest was premised on an outstanding warrant, albeit a defec-
tive one, the majority was not required to address this issue to reach a
final decision. 23 9 However, the dissent and Justice Alito's concurrence
raise an interesting question-Would the strip search of Florence have
been constitutional if he had been arrested prior to any judicial review? 240
As most notably expressed in the Florence dissent, it is "highly
questionable" to subject those arrested for minor crimes prior to judicial
determination to the "dangerous world of the general jail population" and
concurrently subject them to a strip search. 24 1 The example given by the
242dissent was that of a jaywalker. For instance, should a correctional
facility be permitted to subject an arrestee arrested for jaywalking to a
strip search? There are two constitutional issues presented by this hypo-
thetical scenario: (1) whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment to subject those arrested for minor crimes, prior to judicial review,
to a strip search; and (2) whether it is constitutional to direct those arrest-
ed for minor crimes to a jail's general population.
Ultimately, the first issue will likely depend upon the same justifica-
tions relied on by the Court to define the penological interest at issue in
Florence. If viewed on the basis of the arrestee's ultimate destination, the
security interest underlined by the Florence Court is unchanged. The
Fourth Amendment in no way restricts correctional officers from strip,
searching arrestees who are to be placed in a jail's general population,
notwithstanding the possible alternative-holding-facility argument.243
Florence made clear that "there is a substantial interest in preventing any
new inmate" from putting others at risk when admitted to the general
population.24
236. Id.; see also id at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that intake strip search policies may not always
be reasonable for an arrest prior to judicial review).
239. Id at 1514 (majority opinion).
240. Id at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring); Id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. Id at 1515 (majority opinion).
244. Id. at 1520 (emphasis added).
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The counterargument is that the security risks of those arrested prior
to judicial review do not substantiate the personal invasion of a strip
search. This argument, however, depends upon a similar logic struck
down in a previous subpart of this Comment.245 Precluding correctional
officials from using tools that effectively act as a deterrent will encour-
age the manipulation of the correctional system, resulting in increased
danger to the entire correctional community. Therefore, if this issue is
limited to the Florence Court's reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude
that the Fourth Amendment would not preclude strip searches for war-
rantless arrestees arrested for minor offenses.
In addressing the second issue, future petitioners will likely move
beyond the subject of strip searches, and instead challenge the constitu-
tionality of committing warrantless arrestees for minor offenses to a jail's
general population.2 46 If future petitioners establish that it is unconstitu-
tional to commit to the general population those arrested for minor
crimes prior to judicial review, then it would greatly diminish the justifi-
cations validating the strip search in Florence. In essence, correctional
facilities would be left to make the difficult argument that invasive strip
search policies are justified even when arrestees are not directed to the
general population. By sidestepping the constitutional question of the
search and focusing on the destination, a future petitioner may be able to
effectively defeat an invasive strip search policy. 24 7
2. Feasible Alternative Holding Facilities
Justice Alito's concurrence in Florence noted that it may not always
be reasonable for an arrestee to submit to a strip search. 24 8 As he ex-
plained, many correctional facilities maintain separate holding areas out-
side the general population.249 These areas are often used for temporary
detainees or arrestees apprehended for minor offenses.250 In such instanc-
es, Justice Alito suggested that available alternative holding facilities
provide officers the opportunity to segregate minor-offense arrestees.25 1
245. See discussion supra Part Iil.A.2.b.
246. In his dissent in Florence, Justice Breyer suggested that he would find it questionable
committing to the general population those arrested for minor offenses prior to judicial review.
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Given that the Supreme Court has not directly
addressed this issue, future petitioners may use this reasoning as a platform to support additional
attacks on invasive strip search policies.
247. As an aside, this Comment opines that the Court likely would be reluctant to establish a
definitive line of demarcation directing when correctional officials are prohibited from directing an
arrestee to the general population. Due to the lack of uniformity in this country's prison system, such
a strict demarcation would be infeasible for many correctional systems. Instead, it is likely that the
Court would approach the issue by establishing mitigating factors or exceptions to the general hold-
ings of Bell and Florence. See id. at 1523-24 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id at 1524 (Alito, J.,
concurring); id. at 1531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
249. Id (noting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons and some other jails segregate from general
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Thus, because alternative holding areas eliminate security risk to the
jail's general population, the likely penological interest justifying the
Florence Court's holding is diminished. In such cases, Justice Alito in-
ferred that the availability of alternative holding facilities would mitigate
a finding that an invasive strip search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, even under a Bell or Turner analysis. 25 2
It is crucial to note that Justice Alito did not suggest a mandate that
correctional facilities segregate those arrested for minor offenses from
the general population.253 The dissent, on the other hand, suggested that
"it is highly questionable that officials would be justified" in committing
arrestees for minor crimes to the "dangerous world of the general popula-
tion."254 As the dissent would have it, courts would define a strict line of
demarcation that would prohibit those arrested for minor crimes from
being strip-searched and subsequently directed to the general popula-
tion.2 55 The distinction, however, between Justice Alito's viewpoint and
the dissent's is one of discretionary versus mandatory control. Justice
Alito's assertion properly takes into account the realities of varying cor-
rectional operations,256 whereas the dissent would require a strict stand-
ard that undermines the operational flexibilities required by Bell and
Turner. In the end, the reasonable-alternative-holding-facility exception
represents one of the stronger mitigating influences that could dampen
the "harshness" of the Florence decision. However, courts must realize
that this consideration should not be a self-contained standard, but rather
a single factor that may justify not applying the general rule resurrected
in Florence.
3. Emergence of New Technologies
In Florence's brief to the Court, he expressed the availability of less
invasive alternatives-such as pat-down searches, metal detectors, and
the Body Orifice Screening System (BOSS chair)-and concluded that
blanket strip search policies were inappropriate where less invasive al-
ternatives were available.25 7 In such circumstances, subjecting an arrestee
to a strip search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 258 The
Essex facility, where Florence was strip-searched the second time, oper-
ated a BOSS chair during the intake process and required the search of
newly admitted detainees. 25 9 Essex's warden testified that the BOSS
252. Id at 1524-25.
253. Id (explaining that strip searches are not always reasonable when there are available
alternatives).
254. Id. at 1532 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
255. Id.
256. Gibbons & Katzenbach, supra note 159.
257. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct.
1510 (2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 4500813, at * 16 [hereinafter Petitioner Reply Brief].
258. Id. at 8-9.
259. Brief for the Petitioner at 5-6, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510
(2012) (No. 10-945), 2011 WL 2508902 at *5-6.
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chair pinpoints metal objects in inmates' body orifices more accurately
than a standard strip search by an officer. 2 60 Florence asserted that indi-
vidualized suspicion may permit further searches, and that absent reason-
able suspicion, the strip search violated the Constitution.2 61
Florence's failure to consider the limitations of the less invasive
search procedures represents a fatal flaw in his argument. For instance,
pat-down searches fail to provide feedback as to contraband hidden in
body cavities, and metal detectors and the BOSS chair are unable to de-
tect non-metallic items.262 Detecting numerous forms of non-metallic
contraband like drugs, tobacco, paper currency, and plastic weapons is
paramount to a correctional facility's security.263 As stated previously,
these items, although not as physically dangerous, are integral to the un-
derground economy in correctional facilitieS264 and compromise correc-
tional officials' ability to minimize the negative effects that contraband
has on correctional institutions.
The question remains, however, whether the emergence and availa-
bility of new technologies may act as an exception or mitigating factor to
the Florence decision. In Illinois's Cook county jail, correctional offi-
cials have recently replaced outdated body scanning machines with four
Canon RadPro SecurPass machines, at a total cost of $940,500.265 Simi-
lar to the full-body scanners at airports that have attracted so much media
attention, these full-body scanners "can spot minute amounts of contra-
band material" of any form.266 A company spokesperson compares the
process to looking at an x-ray and explains that "if there's something
there that normally wouldn't be in your body, that God didn't give you, it
jumps out of you." 2 67 Full-body scanners like these could add an addi-
tional level of scrutiny to cases brought under a Florence analysis and
could prove to pacify some of the dissent's concern for the degrading
nature of strip searches.2 68 However, it is important to point out that be-
260. Petitioner Reply Brief, supra note 257, at 12.
261. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 259, at 20.
262. Amici-Respondents Brief, supra note 198, at 10-11.
263. See People v. Duncantell, No. E053955, 2012 WL 2394824, at *1-2 (Cal Ct. App. June
26, 2012) (noting that the most common form of contraband in the prison was tobacco); Amici-
Respondents Brief, supra note 198.
264. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.b.
265. Elaine Pittman, Inside Out: County Jails Deploy Whole-Body Scanners to Detect Hidden
Weapons or Contraband, GOV'T TECH., May 2011, at 36, 38.
266. Id. at 36.
267. Id.
268. Florida's Collier County Sheriffs Office also uses Canon's new scanners. Id. However,
the scanning process is classified as a "virtual strip search," and Florida state statutes restrict strip
searches to cases where the arrestee meets certain enumerated criteria. Id. Therefore, although the
scanners are not as invasive as a physical strip search, this possible exception may still cause peti-
tioners to pause because of the inherent privacy concerns and the revealing nature of the images
produced by the scanners.
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cause of the significant costs of new technology, and the Court's general
deference to operational decision makers, such devices will only act as a
mitigating factor and will not likely dissuade the Court in future cases
from the general holding set forth in Florence.2 69
CONCLUSION
To ensure equal protection to all, safety and security procedures at
correctional facilities are paramount. Although it is essential that de-
tained persons retain their constitutional rights, courts must nonetheless
weigh these rights against the need for institutional security. The majori-
ty in Florence correctly recognized this fundamental need. By holding
that the intake strip search policies in question were consistent with the
Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches, the Court resurrect-
ed and affirmed existing precedent. Furthermore, the Court rightly con-
firmed that ever-changing security needs are best served at the hands of
experienced correctional officials rather than from the removed benches
of the courts.
Despite the Court's holding, the insightful concurrences in Florence
point to several potential factual scenarios whereby a strip search may
not be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although the possible
exceptions are worthy of consideration, the likely effect is added discre-
tion among lower courts as they struggle to define and reconcile these
considerations with the foundational rules of Bell, and now Florence. As
circuits seek to apply the principles of Florence they will either return to
a practice that departs from controlling precedent or establish exceptions
or mitigating factors to what may appear to be a degrading rule proffered
by the Florence Court.
Chief Justice Roberts closed his concurrence by announcing that the
Court is "wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that
we 'not embarrass the future."' 270 Ultimately, however, it will be those
exceptions, or the lack of definition thereof, that inhibits blanket strip
search policies from becoming a foregone conclusion. Instead, as the
269. As this Comment has explained through the analysis of the Florence decision, courts
should not force unworkable standards on correctional facilities that serve multiple correctional
functions. Instead, as progeny like Bell and Turner have directed, courts must afford correctional
expertise the latitude to make decisions that are in the best interest of the facility's overall security
and that align with the economics of prison operation. However, as new technologies continue to
emerge and become more cost effective to operate, the presence of less intrusive search methods will
play a more significant role in the determination of the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Nevertheless, the echo of Florence should remain a guidepost to any exception con-
templated by the Court, requiring that the overarching question be one of availability rather than
mandatory control.
270. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012) (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring).
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circuits wrangle with questions left exposed, it is almost certain that the
issue will again require a grant of certiorari.
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